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Johnson v. State, Nev. Adv. Op. No. 113 (Dec. 28, 2006) 1
CRIMINAL LAW – CAPITAL PENALTY HEARING
Summary
Appeal from a death sentence and conviction by jury of four counts of first degree
murder with the use of a deadly weapon, among other crimes, after a death sentence entered by a
three judge panel was appealed and vacated.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed. The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the United States Supreme Court Holdings in Crawford v. Washington 2 do not
apply to the selection phase of a bifurcated capital penalty hearing. This and other issues raised
on appeal do not warrant reversal of his conviction and sentence.
Factual and Procedural History
The facts underlying Johnson’s conviction are explained in more detail in the court’s
2002 opinion.
In August of 1998, Johnson entered a home intending to commit robbery. While inside,
Johnson murdered 20-year-olds Tracey Gorringe and Matthew Mowen, 19-year-old Jeffery
Biddle, and 17-year-old Peter Talamantez. He left the home with several items of insignificant
value. Johnson was later arrested and charged with four counts of first degree murder. In 2000,
a jury convicted him on all counts, but could not agree during his penalty hearing on what
sentence to impose. Another penalty hearing was later held before a three-judge panel, which
sentenced Johnson to death for each of the murders.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Johnson’s conviction in 2002, but the fact that he
was sentenced by a three-judge panel violated the Supreme Court’s holding in Ring v. Arizona. 3
His death sentence was vacated and remanded for a new penalty hearing. The hearing was
bifurcated into two separate phases: death –eligibility and selection.
Death eligibility phase
The State introduced evidence of a singe aggravating circumstance it pursued for each
murder- that Johnson had been convicted of more than one murder.
Johnson called several family members to testify on his behalf. They stated that his
mother and father abused alcohol and illegal drugs, including crack cocaine and PCP, sometimes
in Johnson’s presence. Johnson was beaten and watched his mother being abused by his father.
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At one time, his sisters, and several of his cousins were forced to live in a shed for about
a month in horrible conditions. When the authorities found out, he was taken into custody by the
State and later giver to his grandmother. Johnson grew up in Compton where, as Johnson
explained, there was a lot of violence and he was often chased and beaten.
The jury returned four special verdicts finding the single aggravating circumstance and
seven mitigating circumstances. The jury found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances and that Johnson was eligible for death.
Selection phase
Evidence regarding Johnson’s prior bad acts was admitted during this phase of the
hearing. The State introduced several instances of criminal activity, both in and out of prison,
from the time Johnson was 15 to the time he was arrested for the quadruple murder.
In addition to the prior bad act violence, the State also admitted impact testimony from
the families of Johnson’s four victims. The mother or father of all four victims testified that their
respective child was intelligent, caring, and had a promising future.
The Defense again called on members of Johnson’s family, each expressing the positive
aspects of Johnson’s life. The Defense also presented evidence regarding involvement in street
gangs to stop the harassment of his family. A professor of Sociology from the University of
California at Berkley testified about gangs. Several specialists with whom Johnson had worked
also gave favorable testimony about him. An accomplice in an incident in prison claimed all
responsibility for the incident.
The Jury returned four separate verdicts imposing a death sentence for each of the
murders.
Discussion
The Confrontation Clause and the ruling in Crawford do not apply to the selection phase of a
bifurcated capital penalty hearing
Johnson’s first argument is that the district court violated his right to confrontation by
admitting copies of his inmate disciplinary reports from the Clark County Detention Center
during the selection phase of his hearing. These reports contained hearsay statements by
witnesses who were not shown to be unavailable and whom he had no opportunity to crossexamine.
However, as the court explained in Summers v. State, the right to confrontation does not
apply to evidence admitted in a capital penalty hearing. Therefore, Johnson did not have the
right to confrontation.

Admittance of Johnson’s juvenile records into evidence not an abuse of court discretion
The Supreme Court decision of Roper v. Simmons 4 did not prohibit the admission of
juvenile records during a death penalty hearing, but instead held that executing offenders for
crimes they committed as a minor was cruel and unusual punishment. As there was no question
that Johnson was an adult when he committed the crime, the court’s discretion to allow this
evidence was not an abuse of discretion. Johnson’s juvenile record was relevant to his tendency
to violence and gang activity, but also his amenability to rehabilitation. Despite the prejudicial
effect of the evidence, it was only admitted during the selection phase, thus there are no concerns
that it may have influenced the jury’s weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
The district court was proper in allowing the State to ask questions during “voir dire” to discover
the ability of the jurors to carry out the law.
The district court is given considerable discretion to determine whether a line of
questioning is improper. As the defense made an objection and were overruled, the district court
had the discretion to overrule the defense.
Prosecutor misconduct
While some remarks of the prosecutor were improper, the prejudice resulting from them
was minimal and did not deprive Johnson of a fair hearing. The remarks by a prosecutor are
considered a harmless error where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, thus resulting in no
prejudice to the defendant. 5
Johnson raises several allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.
1. Alleged misconduct during the death-eligibility Phase:
First, the prosecutor argued that if the jurors found in favor of Johnson, it would be
disrespectful to the members of Los Angeles where Johnson grew up. While this reference to
public opinion was inappropriate, its impact was minimal given the correct jury instruction given
that “a verdict may never be influenced by prejudice or public opinion.” The allegation that the
prosecutor violated a pretrial order by referring to the victims as kids was dismissed for similar
reasons. Another statement made in error by the prosecutor was immaterial.
2. Alleged misconduct during the selection Phase:
Johnson claimed that the prosecutor made remarks during his opening statement that
referred to inadmissible evidence and were highly prejudicial. While a prosecutor has a duty to
refrain from making statements in opening arguments that cannot be proved at trial, 6 Johnson did
not contend that the remarks were made in bad faith. 7 These remarks were serious because they
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implied that Johnson would continue the violence even while in prison. However these two
isolated comments were undermined by a five day selection phase and a jury instruction that
opening statements are “not evidence and should not be given evidentiary value.”
Johnson’s penalty hearing was not unfair because a victim’s brother passed out in the courtroom
The victim’s brother had a right to be there, as it was a public hearing
Mandatory Review
The court reviewed the death sentence independently 8 and found that the evidence
supported the finding, the death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice any arbitrary factor, and was not excessive. The murders Johnson committed were
unprovoked, vicious, and utterly senseless. The death sentence was not excessive.
Concurring Opinions
Justice Rose, with whom Justices Maupin and Douglas agreed, filed an opinion
concurring. While J. Rose agreed that Johnson was not entitled to relief, J. Rose believes that
Capital defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to confront the declarants of testimonial
hearsay statements when admitted throughout an unbifurcated hearing and during the eligibility
phase of a bifurcated hearing.
Conclusion
Neither the Confrontation Clause, nor Crawford extend to evidence admitted during the
selection phase of a capital penalty hearing. Johnson’s hearing was fair. The death sentence is
Affirmed.
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